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TAGS: ENRG, TECH, MNUC,
SUBJECT: STAT-MENT OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (JUNE 18, 1981)
1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE BY SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON ON 18 JUNE 1981. QUOTE:
I BELIEVE THAT THIS HEARING POSES TWO BASIC QUESTIONS TO THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE AND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
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FIRST, WAS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT EMBARKED ON A COURSE WHICH COULD YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEREFORE CAN THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQ REACTOR FAIRLY BE DEEMED AN ACT OF SELF-DEFENSE?
SECOND, WHAT STEPS CAN AND SHOULD OUR GOVERNMENT TAKE TO SLOW THESPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY TO UNSTABLE NATIONS HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES?
I ADDRESSED THE SENATE ON MARCH 17 ABOUT MY CONCLUSION THAT IRAQ WAS IN FACT EMBARKED ON A SYSTEMATIC, DETERMINED EFFORT TO GET THE BOMB--A CONCLUSION WHICH WAS, AND STILL IS, SHARED BY SEVERAL KEY EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM I HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HAS COME TO ME IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS WHICH REINFORCES THIS CONCLUSION. THIS INFORMATION RAISES SERIOUS NEW CONCERNS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF OUR PRESENT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO HALT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPA-
BILITY AROUND THE WORLD.

I HAVE RECEIVED FOUR REVEALING INTERNAL DOCUMENTS FROM AMERICAN SOURCES WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. THESE DOCUMENTS ARE NOT CLASSIFIED AND DO NOT CONTAIN ANY NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION. THEY CONTAIN AN ESTIMATE THAT IRAQ COULD HAVE PRODUCED ENOUGH PLUTONIUM EACH YEAR IN THE OSIRAK REACTOR SUFFICIENT FOR UP TO THREE NUCLEAR BOMBS. FURTHERMORE, THESE IAEA DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT POSSIBILITY, INDEED PROBABILITY, THAT THIS

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DETECTED BY THE IAEA INSPECTORS.
IT IS ALSO PROBABLE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE DONE NOTHING TO HALT THE BEGINNING OF THIS PRODUCTION: IT HAD ALREADY SHIPPED AN INITIAL REACTOR FUEL LOAD SUITABLE FOR USE IN PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION. AND IF THE IAEA DID NOT DETECT CLANDESTINE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION, THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE NO CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR INTERRUPTING THEIR ATOMS-FOR-OIL DEAL WITH IRAQ. SINCE THE IRAQI REACTOR APPARENTLY WAS TO BE LOADED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IT IS CLEAR THAT DESTRUCTION OF THE REACTOR AFTER OPERATION STARTED WOULD HAVE DISPERSED ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF LETHAL RADIOACTIVITY OVER BAGHDAD AND ELSEWHERE. THIS PROMPTED ISRAEL TO DESTROY THE IRAQI REACTOR.
UNDER THE TERMS OF IRAQ'S CURRENT AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA, INSPECTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED ONLY TO THREE A YEAR. THUS IRAQ COULD LOAD ITS REACTOR BETWEEN INSPECTIONS, BUT UNLOAD IT BEFORE EACH PRE-ANNOUNCED INSPECTION. UNDER THIS PROCEDURE, IRAQ COULD PRODUCE PLUTONIUM FROM UNSAFEGUARDED URANIUM (YELLOWCAKE) SUFFICIENT FOR ONE BOMB EVERY FOUR MONTHS. AND THEY COULD DO THIS WITHOUT IAEA DETECTION.
TWO DAYS AGO, IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL SIGVARD EKLUND IS REPORTED TO HAVE INFORMED HIS BOARD OF GOVERNORS THAT SUCH PLUTONIUM DIVERSION IN IRAQ WAS NOT FEASIBLE AND WOULD BE DETECTED BY THE IAEA. THIS STATEMENT IS CONTRADICTED BY A SPECIAL STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE IAEA EARLIER THIS YEAR WHICH CONCLUDED THAT AN OSIRIS-TYPE REACTOR LIKE THAT USED IN IRAQ COULD PRODUCE AS MUCH AS 24 KG. OF PLUTONIUM PER YEAR--AS MUCH AS THREE BOMBS WORTH. IN RESPONSE TO THIS STUDY, AN EXTRAORDINARY

MEETING OF NINE SENIOR IAEA TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS WAS CONVENED TO CONSIDER THE DANGERS PRESENTED BY THE IRAQI PROGRAM. THEY REPORTED THEIR UNANIMOUS CONCLUSION TO EKLUND'S PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, MR. HANS GRUEMM, ON MARCH

10, 1981, THAT SUCH "(PLUTONIUM) DIVERSION PATHS ARE TECHNICALLY PRACTICABLE". THEY CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS "VERY UNLIKELY" THAT SOME (IAEA) MEMBER STATES LIKE IRAQ, WOULD ACCEPT THE INSPECTION ACTIVITIES NECESSARY TO DETECT SUCH A DIVERSION.
THE SPECIALISTS NOTED THAT STRENGTHENED INSPECTION ACTIVITIES WOULD "REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE SCOPE OF AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY" AND COULD COME ABOUT ONLY BY NEGOTIATION WITH THE HOST COUNTRY.
RESPONDING TO THE SPECIALISTS CONCLUSIONS, A SENIOR OFFICIAL IN THE IAEA INSPECTORATE REPORTED TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SAFEGUARDS OPERATIONS THAT SUCH INSPECTION WOULD "INTRODUCE AN ENTIRELY NEW DIMENSION IN THE SAFEGUARD POLICY WHEREBY WE GO LOOKING FOR CLANDESTINE INSTALLATIONS INSTEAD OF VERIFYING STATEMENTS". THE SUGGESTION THAT HOST NATIONS WOULD AGREE TO SUCH STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS WAS DISMISSED WITH THE COMMENT THAT "IF WE WERE TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THIS POLICY, THE STATES INVOLVED WOULD LAUGH THEIR HEADS OFF...".
THESE DOCUMENTS POINT UP THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAW IN THE IAEA AS CURRENTLY CONFIGURED. THEY SHOW WHY THERE IS PRESENTLY NO BASIS FOR PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN AGENCY SAFEGUARDS. THESE SAFEGUARDS SIMPLY ARE NOT COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGHT TO DO THE JOB.
THE IAEA--UNLESS WE STRENGTHEN IT--MUST NEGOTIATE
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WITH EACH HOST COUNTRY WHAT IT WILL BE SHOWN AND WHEN IT WILL SEE IT. INSPECTORS COME IN AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS ADVANCE NOTICE AND LIMIT THEIR CHECK TO PREDESIGNATED FACILITIES AND MATERIAL. THIS PROVIDES AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR ANY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED UP.
I HAVE ALSO LEARNED FROM AN IAEA INSPECTOR IN THE SECTION RESPONSIBLE FOR IRAQ THAT SEVERAL OF THE MOST SENSITIVE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES WERE, IN FACT, UNDER NO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS WHATEVER. NOT SUBJECT TO INSPECTION WERE THE POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE "HOT CELLS" FOR FUEL FABRICATION AND PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING. AND NOT SUBJECT TO INSPECTION WAS THE STOCKPILE RAW URANIUM YELLOWCAKE, WHICH COULD BE USED FOR PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION.
PERHAPS THESE CENTRAL DEFECTS WERE WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD IN MIND WHEN HE STATESAT HIPRESS CONFERENCE TUESDAY THAT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY "DOESN'T LEAD ITSELF TO VERIFICATION...HOW MANY COUNTRIES DO WE KNOW THAT HAVE SIGNED IT THAT VERY POSSIBLY ARE GOING AHEAD WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS?" THE PRESIDENT, QUITE PROPERLY, ASKED.

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THE DOCUMENTS I HAVE OBTAINED ESTABLISH THAT THE INSPECTORS OF THE IRAQI PROGRAM WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO LOOK FOR ANY SUSPECTED CLANDESTINE BOMB-MAKING FACILITIES. THIS LACK OF AUTHORITY IS NOT THE FAULT OF THE IAEA. EVEN THE OFFICIAL IAEA SPOKESMAN, GEORGE DELACOIGNE, ADMITTED THAT: "WE ARE NOT A POLICE AGENCY. WE ARE AN ACCOUNTING SYSTEM."
THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE IAEA MANDATE UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE IS TOO LIMITED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS THAT WOULD PREVENT CLANDESTINE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

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I HAVE ALSO RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT SINCE 1976, ONLY SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN INSPECTORS HAVE VISITED IRAQ. ANY NATION SUBJECT TO IAEA INSPECTION HAS THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE NATIONALITY OF PROPOSED INSPECTORS. THIS VETO, IN EFFECT, ENABLES EACH NATION TO HANDPICK ITS INSPECTORS.
IRAQ HAD THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO ANY AMERICAN CITIZEN SERVING AS AN INSPECTOR, AND IRAQ HAD INFORMALLY EXERCISED THAT RIGHT. THE OFTEN-CITED "MOST RECENT" INSPECTION IN IRAQ IN JANUARY WAS REPORTEDLY CONDUCTED WITH THE LIGHTS IN THE FACILITY TURNED OUT. IT WAS LIMITED TO A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE FUEL. AND THE WHOLE OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED BY FLASHLIGHT. SEVERAL FUEL ELEMENTS COULD NOT BE VERIFIED BECAUSE THEY WERE LOCKED IN A VAULT AND THE KEY COULD NOT BE LOCATED AT THAT TIME.
I HAVE LEARNED FROM NON-IAEA SOURCES THAT YAHIA EL-MESHAD, THE EGYPTIAN-BORN SCIENTIST WHO WAS A PRINCIPAL IN THE IRAQI PROGRAM UNTIL HE WAS MURDERED IN PARIS LAST YEAR, HAD UNSUCCESSFULLY ADVOCATED EGYPTIAN PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH THE PRECISE COURSE THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY WERE PURSUING. THAT IS, 1. PURCHASE OF A VERY LARGE HIGH-FLUX MATERIAL TEST REACTOR (MTR). 2. IRRADIATION IN THE REACTOR CORE AND IN THE BLANKET OF URANIUM SPECIMENTS TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM. 3. DEVELOPMENT OF A SMALL-SCALE REPROCESSING CAPABILITY TO SEPARATE THE PLUTONIUM FROM THE IRRADIATED, UNSAFEGUARDED URANIUM.
FINALLY, AN AMERICAN INSPECTOR AT THE IAEA IN THE

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SECTION RESPONSIBLE FOR IRAQ, WHO HAS FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEAKNESSES OF IAEA INSPECTION PROCEDURES, RESIGNED TUESDAY. HE HAS FLOWN TO WASHINGTON TO PRESENT TESTIMONY TO THIS COMMITTEE ON THE IRAQI PROGRAM. IN PARTICULAR AND ON THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF THE

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INADEQUACY OF IAEA INSPECTION SAFEGUARDS IN GENERAL. HE IS ROGER RICHTER AND HE WILL APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE TOMORROW MORNING. WHILE THE COMMITTEE WILL HEAR FROM MR. RICHTER HIMSELF TOMORROW, I WANT TO QUOATE BRIEFLY FROM THE ANALYSIS HE PROVIDED THE U.S. MISSION TO THE IAEA IN 1980:

"...THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION POINTS TO AN AGGRESSIVE COORDINATED PROGRAM BY IRAQ TO DEVELOP A NUCELAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

"AS A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS INSPECTOR AT THE IAEA, MY CONCERN AND COMPLAINT -" THAT IRAQ WILL BE ABLE TO CONDUCT THIS PROGRAM UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND WHILE VIOLATING THE PROVISIONS OF NPT. THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARE TOTALLY INCAPABLE OF DETECTING THE PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM IN LARGE-SIZE MATERIAL TEST REACTORS UNDER THE PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS. PERHAPS THE MOST DISTURBING IMPLICATION OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS THAT THE NPT AGREEMENT HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF ASSISTING IRAQ IN ACQUIRING THE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR ITS PROGRAM BY ABSOLVING THE COOPERATING NATIONS OF THEIR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY BY SHIFTING IT TO THE IAEA. THESE COOPERATING NATIONS HAVE THWARTED CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF THEIR ACTIONS BY POINTING TO IRAQ'S SIGNING OF NPT. WHILE TURNING AWAY FROM THE NUMEROUS, OBVIOUS AND COMPELLING EVIDENCE WHICH LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THATIRAQISEMBARKED ON ANUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM."

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MR. CHAIRMAN, THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE DEFENSIVE ACTION BY A MORTALLY THREATENED ISRAEL HAVE RAISED PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE IMMENSE;DANGERS OF THE SPREAD OF THE BOMB.

WE MUST NOW LOOK FORWARD. WE NEED TO DEVISE NEW MEANS FOR STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL APPROACH FOR CONTROLLING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CLEARLY IS NOT WORKING. IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM OSTENSIBLY WAS UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. BUT THE GLARING WEAKNESSES OF THE INSPECTION SYSTEM COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ISRAEL'S DECISION THAT A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE WAS NECESSARY.

WE NEED TO THINK ANEW ON THE WHOLE THREAT OF PROLIFERATION. WE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE IAEA AND ITS SAFEGUARDS MANDATE.

WE NEED TO INCREASE IAEA ACCESS TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND TO IMPROVE ITS ENTIRE SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM.

WE NEED TO BUILD UPON THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.

WE NEED TO CONSTRUCT A NEW CONSENSUS AMONG CLEAR

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SUPPLIER NATIONS TO HALT THE USE OF DIRECTLY WEAPONS-
USABLE MATERIALS AND THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECH-
NOLOGY TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES.
AND WE NEED TO STRENGTHEN OUR OWN NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION ACT, WHICH SETS THE STANDARDS FOR OUR
OWN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR COMMERCE.
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THE SPREAD OF THE BOMB PRESENTS THE HUMAN RACE WITH
OUR MOST FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE. THE VERY SURVIVAL OF
OUR CIVILIZATION IS PLACED AT RISK WHEN THE CAPACITY
TO PRODUCE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IS ALLOWED TO
SPREAD AROUND THE GLOBE. WE MUST ALL WORK TOGETHER
ON THIS PROBLEM. THERE CAN BE NO MORE IMPORTANT TASK.
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